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Abstract
This study aims to examine the influence of board independence on corporate social
responsibility (CSR) reporting by publicly listed companies in Malaysia. Content analysis was
used to determine the extent of CSR reporting. A reporting index consisting of 51 items was
developed based on six themes: General, Community, Environment, Human Resources,
Marketplace and Other. An Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression was used to examine the
relationship between board independence and firm CSR reporting. The results indicate that the
association between board independence and company CSR reporting is industry specific.
Overall, the empirical evidence partially supports agency theory
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1.

Introduction

Companies have reported on their Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) obligations for
more than three decades (Deegan, 2013). The notion of CSR requires companies to consider the
social, economic and environmental consequences of their operations and suggests that they
address the needs and expectations of stakeholders such as investors, customers, suppliers,
regulators and society. Consequently, growing numbers of companies are informing their
stakeholders of their social and environmental performance through print-based reporting or their
websites. Although it is costly and voluntary by nature, companies still embrace in CSR, as it has
been accepted as a long-term business strategy (Jamali and Mirshak, 2007) and a source of
competitive advantage. It is a way to gain, maintain and repair legitimacy (Deegan et al., 2000),
and it enhances a company’s reputation and risk management.
Consistent with the increased importance of CSR, boards’ roles and responsibilities have been
extended from the traditional shareholder-centric view to encompass various stakeholders.
Boards of directors influence CSR in various ways, from establishing stakeholder friendly
corporate policies to creating committees that deal with CSR-related matters. They are also
expected to monitor company performance financially and socially (Janggu et al., 2014) and are
accountable for any decisions made by management to serve for the best interest of shareholders.
The board of directors also plays a pivotal role in a company’s CSR activities. Nevertheless, the
decision to demonstrate social and environmental responsibility to relevant stakeholders through
CSR reporting often depends on management’s personal wealth considerations (Watts and
Zimmerman, 1990). Jensen and Meckling (1976) postulate that a separation of ownership and
control in a company provides managers with the incentive to serve their personal interests at the
expense of shareholders’ interests. In the context of the company, a major issue is the
information asymmetry between managers and shareholders. This phenomenon can cause the
public to question the integrity and effectiveness of monitoring mechanisms in organizations. An
alleged lack of independence is considered the root cause of a board’s failure to effectively
monitor the actions of management. Therefore, it is claimed that greater emphasis should be
made on the internal context, which includes boards, particularly to increase shareholder insight
and influence corporate behaviour in organizations (Buniamin et al., 2011).
Proponents of corporate board reform have long supported increasing independent director
representation as a means of increasing the objectivity and effectiveness of boards. Fama and
Jensen (1983) claim that the effectiveness of board monitoring is enhanced by including
independent directors because they have incentives to perform their monitoring function
effectively and not collude with managers. This is partly driven by the fact that their reputation
and their human capital value depend on their judgement as decision control specialists.
Accordingly, their presence is commonly associated with lower information asymmetry and
better reporting (Htay et al., 2012). Independent directors also have a significant effect on
corporate social activities, such as charitable giving (Post et al., 2011), andthe ethical aspects of
the company’s activities (Ibrahim et al., 2003) and reduce agency cost (Kyereboah-Coleman and
Biekpe, 2006). These views have eventually led to the movement toward specific board
guidelines, typically calling for greater representation of independent directors.
This study aims to examine board practices on company CSR reporting in Malaysia. Itis a semideveloped country with a different economic, legal, and cultural environment from developed
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countries, where most previous studies have been conducted. Malaysia is characterised by high
ownership concentration, where family block-ownerships and “dominant” shareholders are
commonly present in listed companies (Mustapha and Che Ahmad, 2011). Unlike companies
with dispersed shareholdings, these companies seemingly have reduced agency problems and
costs due to a better match of control and cash flow rights of shareholders (Mustapha and Che
Ahmad, 2011). Nonetheless, due to the highly concentrated ownership and control, Malaysian
listed companies face a unique “principal-principal” agency problem instead of the traditional
“principal-agent” agency problem (Rashid, 2015).The conflict between family and non-family
principals emerges when family owners engage in strategies that advance personal, family or
political agendas at the expense of minority owners. This agency conflict, which includes the
pursuit of non-economic goals that purportedly diverge from the interest of minority investors, if
not monitored properly, may lead to severe expropriation of minority shareholders. Coupled with
ineffective minority shareholder protection, this type of conflict presents a major challenge to
corporate governance practices in developing countries.
Further, CSR practices often create conflict between minority and controlling shareholders, as
they reduce the wealth of the latter. Thus, a board of directors, especially one with independent
directors, plays a major role in addressing this unique conflict. Further, understanding board
independence and its impact on CSR reporting provides evidence on the effectiveness of the
Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG) guidelines. This study also adds to the
limited literature that addresses principal-principal conflicts in developing countries in addition
to extending prior work that has mostly focused on the monitoring role of independent directors
in a traditional agency problem setting.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section two presents the literature review
and research questions. Section three presents an overview of corporate governance and
corporate board practices in Malaysia. Section four presents the theoretical framework. Section
five outlines the methodology. Section six presents and discusses the results. The final section is
the conclusion.
2. Literature Review and Research Questions
Studies examining board independence and CSR reporting present varying outcomes. There are
vast arrays of factors that are likely to moderate the relationship, such as differences in the
institutional context, differences in corporate governance systems, different time periods, the
unique CSR challenges in each country, and variation in methods applied as well as definitions
used for the variables. Apart from this, independent directors were included on boards as early as
the mid-1980s in the US and Europe (Tinggi et. al., 2015). However, a similar idea was brought
to light by companies in Asia, especially after the financial crisis from the late 1990s until the
late 2000s. Its evolution has since made the issue of independent directors prominent. The
development that has taken place shows the differing views of the importance of board
independence. This is reflected in the results of previous studies. In fact, the idea that the
majority of the directors of a listed public company should be independent is relatively new in
many countries. This study is conducted at a time when the issue of independent directors is
central to effective corporate governance.
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Leung and Horwitz (2004) report that a positive relationship exists between board independence
and voluntary segment disclosure for companies listed in Hong Kong. Cheng and Courtenay
(2006) document a positive relationship between board independence and voluntary disclosure
for 104 Singapore companies. A study of European biotech companies by Cerbioni and
Parbonetti (2007) shows that the proportion of independent directors has positive effects on the
level of voluntary disclosure. Examining the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on
social and environmental disclosures of banking companies in Malaysia and Australian
companies, respectively, Htayet. al. (2012) and Rao et. al. (2012) acknowledge the importance of
independent directors in enhancing companies’ reporting. Likewise, Jiziet. al. (2014) find a
positive relationship between board independence and CSR reporting. Other studies that report
comparable results are Rashid and Lodh (2008), Barako and Brown (2008), Akhtaruddin et al.
(2009) and Chau and Gray (2010). Conversely, examining the impact of board composition and
ownership structure on the voluntary disclosure of 158 Singapore companies, Eng and Mak
(2003) show that board composition significantly and negatively affects voluntary disclosure.
Similar findings have been reported bailiff and Cooke (2005). Independent directors are hindered
in their ability to influence majority board decisions (Abdullah et al., 2011).In the same vein,
Gul and Leung (2004), along with others(e.g.,Allegrini and Greco, 2013; Rouf, 2011), document
a negative relationship between board independence and voluntary disclosure. Meanwhile, Said
et al. (2009), Haji (2013), Shamil et al. (2014) and Sartawi et al. (2014) find no evidence of a
significant association between board independence and CSR disclosures. Michelon and
Parbonetti (2012) argue that independent directors may be elected to focus mainly on a
monitoring role only as a way of protecting investors against managerial misbehaviour. Thus,
reporting aspects have been neglected. Nonetheless, they strongly believe that disclosure should
be considered an indirect monitoring mechanism.
In general, the majority of the empirical evidence suggests that board independence has some
impact on CSR reporting. However, studies are scant in developing countries. Hence, the
objective of this study is to examine the influence of board independence on the CSR reporting
of public listed companies in Malaysia.
3.

Corporate governance and corporate board practices in Malaysia

The Companies Act 1965 provides the laws relating to directors’ roles and responsibilities, while
the Articles of Association outline the regulations for the internal management of a company’s
affairs. The law considers a company as a separate legal entity and adopts a “one-tier” AngloAmerican model of corporate governance. This “market or shareholder” model regards the board
of directors as the uppermost governing body in the company. “One-tier” boards are directly
involved in company decisions, initiatives and outcomes. To ensure directors act as an effective
vehicle of corporate governance in Malaysia, they are obliged to undergo a Mandatory
Accreditation Programme (MAP), which is reinforced by an annual Continuing Education
Programme (CEP). In addition, Bursa Malaysia, through its Listing Requirement, has also
provided guidelines on determining independent directors. Practise Note 13 states that an
independent director Isa director who is independent of management and free from any business
or other relationship that could interfere with the exercise of independent judgement or the
ability to act in the best interests of an applicant or a listed issuer. In a one-tier board system,
members of the board of directors are allowed to hold both executive and non-executive
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positions. Hence, the objectivity and independence of the directors in monitoring and assessing
the performance of the management might be hampered, since they may also be a part of the
management team. This weakens independent directors’ ability to oversee the implementation of
decisions.
In addition, Malaysia’s corporate ownership is highly concentrated, with most companies either
family or government owned (Classenset. al., 2000). Controlling shareholders normally hold
powerful positions on both the top management team and the board of directors, enabling them
to make important decisions such as those concerning profit-sharing policy. Consequently, this
causes an inequitable treatment with regard to minority shareholders. There is seldom a
separation of management and ownership; hence, the agency problem in Malaysia is present. It is
also common to find that the chairman of the board is also the chief executive officer.
Considering this, the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance recommends, as a best practice,
that there needs to be a balance on the board of directors with at least one-third of the members
being independent. Their inclusion is based on (i) their experience and knowledge, (ii) their
contacts, and (iii) their independence from the CEO. Malaysian business practice is dominated
by owner-managed companies, where the prime shareholder is also the primary founder. When a
single body is entrusted with both managing and supervising the company's operations, it is more
difficult to guarantee the independence of board members. In addition, it is common that
‘independent’ directors are either family members or friends instead of genuinely independent.
Accordingly, the degree of independence of many board of directors is questionable.
4.

Theoretical Framework

Issues pertaining to corporate governance such as monitoring mechanisms are very much related
to agency theory. This theory emerged in the 1970s as a powerful framework to address the
conflicting relationship between owners and managers and to suggest possible resolutions. An
agency relationship exists when there is a change of control previously held by owners
(principals) to control by managers (agents). Jensen and Meckling (1976) define the relationship
as a "contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the
agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision-making
authority to the agent" (p. 308). Agency theory argues that the separation of ownership and
control in companies has resulted in a potential conflict of interests between the owners and their
managers. It induces managers to exhibit different attitudes toward risk and conflicting goals
with owners, such as investment in unprofitable projects and excessive use of free cash flow
(Fama and Jensen, 1983). While principal-agent conflicts are prevalent in most developed
countries, countries with concentrated ownership are confronted with principal-principal agency
conflicts (Dharwadkar et.al, 2000). Following the incongruence of interests between shareholder
groups, controlling shareholders can exploit minority shareholders through managerial
facilitation.
Managers in developed countries are most likely to opt for CSR activities on the grounds of selfinterest even if the corporate governance system is focused on shareholder primacy. To them,
CSR acts as a personal reputational building tool. This different perception of the purpose of
CSR can result in a conflict between managers and shareholders. In developing countries with
potential principal-principal agency conflicts, managers in most cases are less independent
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from—and may even be strongly affiliated with—founding owners or major shareholders. They
tend to expropriate value from other shareholders to increase the wealth of the controlling
owners. Consequently, managers in Malaysia, for instance, might seek opportunities that
immediately benefit themselves, as well as founding families, by disengaging from longer-term,
outcome-uncertain and costly social investments (Chang et. al., 2015). Accordingly, despite the
increasing pressure on companies to engage in CSR, many have resisted it.
How organizations control agency problems has been of great interest. Fama and Jensen (1983)
note that the board's "most important role is to scrutinize the highest decision makers in the firm"
(p.294). Given the power to authorize and monitor important decisions enables the board to
accomplish its monitoring role (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Independent directors are professional
referees whose task is to stimulate and oversee the competition among the firm's management.
Agency theory advocates that boards comprising a higher proportion of independent directors are
more diligent in pursuing their monitoring role, due to their independence from management.
A divergence of interest between managers and shareholders may create information asymmetry;
hence, incurring agency costs is closely aligned with those interests (Mustapha and Che Ahmad,
2011). Jensen and Meckling (1976) define agency costs as the sum of the monitoring
expenditures by the owners (e.g., the use of boards of directors), the bonding expenditures by
managers (e.g., the preparation of financial statements) and the residual loss. Two mechanisms
that can possibly mitigate the agency and asymmetric information problems and alleviate agency
costs are board monitoring and transparency through disclosure. Htay et al. (2012) suggests that
disclosure of information, or transparency, is an integral part of corporate governance, as higher
disclosure can reduce information asymmetry, which not only clarifies the conflicts of interests
between shareholders and management but also makes management more accountable. Forker
(1992) fined that the presence of independent board members enhances financial disclosure
quality and reduced the benefits of withholding information.
Boards of directors have an important role in alleviating agency costs (Fama and Jensen, 1983).
Researchers with an agency-cantered view believe that independent directors have the
responsibilities to enhance company transparency in order to protect shareholders’ interests
(Michelon and Parbonetti, 2012). By disclosing more CSR information in annual reports, this
reduces asymmetric information and enhances or maintains the company’s reputation/protection.
Therefore, an effective board promotes CSR due to its ability to align managers’ interests with
the long-term goals of both shareholders and non-shareholding stakeholders.
Increased numbers of independent directors on a board creates a higher demand for voluntary
disclosure to shareholders via better monitoring (Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008).Therefore, based
on agency theory, it is hypothesized that board independence positively influences company
CSR reporting.
5.
5.1

Methods
Data

This study utilised a sample of non-financial companies listed on the Main Market of Bursa
Malaysia from 2008 until 2013. The study period enabled an examination of the trends in the
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CSR reporting practices of PLC in Malaysia. To be included in the sample, the company must
have produced an annual report each year. Although there are quite a number of companies that
issue stand-alone CSR reports and most companies made disclosure on their website, the
information on those channels normally replicates what is reported in the annual report (Rashid,
2015). Initially, there were 813 companies listed on the Main Market of Bursa Malaysia as of
31st December 2013. Only 613 companies lodged their annual reports each and every year.
Companies in the finance sector are subject to different regulatory and disclosure requirements,
and material differences in their types of operation were thus excluded. Prior studies have not
considered them (e.g., MohdGhazali, 2007; Said et al., 2009; Haniffa and Cooke, 2005), and 136
finance companies were excluded from the sample, reducing the potential population to 477
companies. A further 27 companies were omitted due to incomplete data, which left a sample of
450 companies (Table 1).
Using the six annual reports for each company as the main source of information is based on
several justifications. This is consistent with other prior studies (Chan et al., 2014; Abdullah et
al., 2011; Ibrahim and Samad, 2011; Haji, 2013). Further, annual reports are presumed to be the
main vehicle used by companies to communicate information to the public (Hasnah et al., 2006,
Gray et al., 2001, Othman and Ameer, 2010), including social and environmental reporting
(Chan et al., 2014).
Table 1 Sample company characteristics

Sector

Number of firms Observed firm Observation in
in the sample
years
%

Agricultural Production - Crops
Agricultural Production - Livestock
Fishing, Hunting and Trapping
Metal Mining
Oil and Gas Extraction
Food and Kindered Products
Tobacco Products
Textile Mill Products
Apparel and Other Textile Products
Lumber and Wood Products
Furniture and Fixtures
Paper and Allied Products
Printing and Publishing
Chemicals and Allied Products
Petroleum and Coal Products
Rubber and Misc. Plastics Products
Leather and Leather Products
Stone, Clay and Glass Products

25
5
1
3
4
32
1
2
8
25
13
19
7
11
4
18
1
21
67

150
30
6
18
24
192
6
12
48
150
78
114
42
66
24
108
6
126

5.56
1.11
0.22
0.67
0.89
7.11
0.22
0.44
1.78
5.56
2.89
4.22
1.56
2.44
0.89
4.00
0.22
4.67
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Primary Metal Industries
Fabricated Metal Products
Industrial, Machinery and Equipment
Electronic and Other Electric Equipment
Transportation Equipment
Misc. Manufacturing Industries
Electricity, Gas and Sanitary Services
General Building Contractors
Heavy Construction, Ex. Building
Wholesale Trade- Durable Goods
Wholesale Trade- Non-Durable Goods
General Merchandise Stores
Food Stores
Automotive Dealers and Service Stations
Apparel and Accessory Stores
Eating and Drinking Places
Hotels and Other Lodging Places
Trucking and Warehousing
Water Transportation
Transportation By Air
Transportation Services
Communications
Real Estate
Business Services
Educational Services
Health Services
Amusement and Recreational Services
Total

23
6
15
24
11
23
5
21
14
11
9
4
1
3
2
1
8
4
11
1
6
7
11
18
1
8
2
450

138
36
90
144
66
138
30
126
84
66
54
24
6
18
12
6
48
24
66
6
36
42
66
108
6
48
12
2700

5.11
1.33
3.33
5.33
2.44
5.11
1.11
4.67
3.11
2.44
2.00
0.89
0.22
0.67
0.44
0.22
1.78
0.89
2.44
0.22
1.33
1.56
2.44
4.00
0.22
1.78
0.44
100.00

5.2
Variables
5.2.1Dependent variables
Content analysis was used to investigate environmental disclosures in the annual reports (e.g.,
Chan et al., 2014; Abdullah et al., 2011; Ibrahim and Samad, 2011; Haji, 2013). Content analysis
is a technique used by researchers to replicate and make valid inferences from data in their
context (Krippendorff, 1989) and involves both qualitative and quantitative methods and
converting information in annual reports into scores (Djajadikerta and Trireksani, 2012).
To assess the content of CSR reporting, a checklist of items was constructed by examining
previous CSR reporting checklists (e.g., Hackston and Milne, 1996; Barako and Brown, 2008).
In addition, Malaysian checklists in particular were also referenced (e.g., Abdullah et al., 2011;
Haji, 2013). To ensure conformation of the checklist items to the listing requirements and their
relevance to the current Malaysian context, the framework launched by Bursa Malaysia in 2006
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was also used as a reference. It comprises guidelines for PLCs in defining their CSR priorities,
implementation and reporting. The framework focuses on four dimensions: Environment,
Community, Marketplace and Workplace. A checklist of 22 CSR items developed by Abdullah
et al. (2011)was used as the benchmark. This checklist adapted the work of MohdGhazali
(2007)and incorporated aspects of Hackston and Milne (1996) and Ng (1985). The referred
checklist was used to capture CSR reporting of companies in a similar institutional setting as the
present study, hence confirming its suitability. Checklists by Mohamed Adnan (2012)and Chanet
al. (2014) were also referenced apart from the inclusion of several items from the Global
Reporting Initiative Guidelines in an attempt to obtain a more comprehensive checklist. After
going through several revisions and refinements, the final checklist containing 51 items was
produced (Table 2).
Each disclosure item was assigned a score of “1” if it is disclosed and “0” if it is not disclosed.
This has been extensively employed previously (e.g., Haji, 2013; Haniffa and Cooke, 2005;
Rashid and Lodh, 2008; MohdGhazali, 2007). The scores were transformed into a CSR reporting
index by dividing the disclosure score of each company to the maximum possible score (i.e., 1 x
51= 51).
nj

CSRIi=

∑

t =1

nj

X ij

,

CSRI = CSR reporting index;
nj = number of items expected for jth company;
Xij = 1 if ith item disclosed; 0 if ith item not disclosed
Table 2 CSR Reporting checklist
CSR Reporting Items
A
General (maximum 7 scores)
1
Acknowledgement or management of corporate social responsibility
2
Disclosure of corporate objectives or policies with regard to corporate social responsibility
3
Company’s strategy for addressing sustainability
4
Mission/ values/ codes of conduct relevant to CSR topics
5
Commitments to external initiatives (e.g., membership)
6
Awards received relating to social, environmental and best practices
7
Discussion on stakeholder engagement
B
Community (maximum 9 scores)
Charitable donations and activities (such as donations of cash, products or employee
8
services to support established community activities, events, organisations, education and
the arts)
Supporting government/ non-governmental organization campaign (such as supporting
9
national pride/government-sponsored campaigns)
Support for public health/ volunteerism (such as blood donation, sponsoring public health
10
or recreational projects)
11 Aid medical research
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12
13
14
15
16
C
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
D
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42

Sponsoring educational programs/ scholarship (such as sponsoring educational
conferences, seminars or art exhibits, funding scholarship programs or activities)
Discussion on public policy involvement
Graduate employment
Sponsoring sports project
Acquisition from local suppliers
Environment (maximum 14 scores)
Statements indicating that pollution from operations have been or will be reduced
Discussion on recycling efforts (such as recycled inputs/ recycled waste)
Preventing waste
Disclosure on significant spills/ environmental accidents
Hazardous waste disclosure
Fines/ sanction for non-compliance
Design facilities that are harmonious with the environment/ landscaping (such as
contributions in terms of cash or art/sculptures to beautify the environment, restoring
historical buildings and structures)
Impacts on biodiversity
Strategies/ plans for managing impacts on biodiversity (such as wildlife conservation,
protection of the environment, e.g., pest controls)
Environmental review and audit (such as reference to environmental review, scoping, audit,
and assessment including independent attestation)
Conservation of energy in the conduct of business operations ( using energy more efficiently
during the manufacturing process)
Utilizing waste materials for energy production
Disclosure of carbon/ green gas emissions
Initiatives to reduce carbon/ green gas emissions
Workplace (maximum 14 scores)
Employee profiles (such as number of employees in the company and/or at each branch/
subsidiary, information on the qualifications and experience of employees recruited)
Employee appreciation (such as information on purchase scheme/ pension program)
Discussion of significant benefit program provided (such as remuneration, providing staff
accommodation or ownership schemes)
Employee training (such as through in-house training, establishing training centres)
Support to employee education (such as giving financial assistance to employees in
educational institutions; continuing education courses)
Information on management-employee relationship/ efforts to improve job satisfaction
(such as providing information about communication with employees on management styles
and management programs which may directly affect the employees)
Employee diversity (such as disclosing the percentage or number of minority and/or
women employees in the workforce and/or in the various managerial levels)
Employee receiving regular reviews
Recreational activities/ facilities
Establishment of a safety department/ committee/ policy
Provision of health care for employee
Compliance to health and safety standards and regulations
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43
44
E
45
46
47
48
49
F
50
51
5.2.2

Award for health and safety
Rates of work-related injury/ illness/ deaths (such as disclosing accident statistics)
Marketplace (maximum 5 scores)
Information on any research project set up by the company to improve its products in any
way (such as the amount/percentage figures of research and development expenditure
and/or its benefits)
Verifiable information that the quality of the firm’s products has increased (such as
ISO9000)
Disclosure of products meeting applicable safety standards (such as information on the
safety of the firm’s product)
Product sustainability/ use of child labour
Customer service improvements/ awards/ ratings
Other (maximum 2 scores)
Value added statements
Value added ratios
Independent and control variables

The independent variable of interest in this study is board independence. Board independence
refers to independent directors who have no affiliation with the company except for their
directorship (Bursa Malaysia, 2006). Board independence (BIND) is the number of independent
directors on the board relative to the total number of directors (Arora and Dharwadkar (2011);
Harjoto and Jo (2011) and Das et al. (2015).
Following the stream of previous studies, a number of governance attributes and the company’s
characteristics that might affect CSR reporting are investigated as control variables in this study:
board size, directors’ ownership, institutional ownership, debt ratio, liquidity, company age,
company size, profitability, company growth and market capitalisation. Board size is one of the
governance attributes that has a major influence on a company’s operation. Although there is no
universal “best” size, García Sánchez et al. (2011) claim that a board should comprise a
considerable number of experienced directors. They should ensure full deliberation and diversity
of thinking on governance and other organizational matters. Smaller boards are expected to
benefit from more efficient communication, coordination and accountability of individual board
members (Jizi et al., 2014). However, they suffer from limited monitoring ability due to higher
workloads and less diversified range of expertise. Similarly, larger boards are inefficient because
they result in weaker control of management and increase agency costs but can offer more
knowledge and expertise, as well as more capacity for monitoring and sharing workload (Larmou
and Vafeas, 2010). Board size refers to the number of directors who compose the board (Ntim
and Soobaroyen, 2013; Jizi et al., 2014). An ideal board size would be different across
companies. Board size (BSIZE) is defined as the natural logarithm of the total number of
directors, following Rashid (2013).
Directors’ level of ownership is presumed to have an important effect on their willingness to
monitor managers and enhance shareholders’ value (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). It helps
motivate directors to do their monitoring job effectively. Director ownership (DIROWN) is
expressed as the ratio of total director shareholdings to the total number of shares. Institutional
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investors are a special group of shareholders with a relatively concentrated larger stake of shares.
By holding substantial shares in a company, they can exert considerable influence on
management, including disclosure of CSR information. Institutional ownership (INSTITUT) is
the ratio of total institutional shareholdings to the total number of shares, as defined by Nasir and
Abdullah (2004) and Barako et al. (2006).Leverage (DR) is measured by the ratio of total
liabilities to total assets. Barnea and Rubin (2010) believe that the need for managers of highly
leveraged companies to generate and retain cash to service debts might reduce their ability to
fund CSR activities. Conversely, companies with high debt levels are expected to incur high
monitoring costs. An opposing view is that they disclose more information to reduce costs (Esa
and MohdGhazali, 2012) and to meet the needs of their lenders (Abdullah et al., 2011).
Profitability has been demonstrated to have an effect on CSR practices. Since CSR activities are
not cost-free, and companies that are highly profitable are able to absorb the associated costs;
hence, they disclose more information to stakeholders. Haniffa and Cooke (2005) and Khan
(2010) show that profitability is a vital factor in relation to disseminating social information by
companies. Profitability is proxied by Return on Assets (ROA) following Rashid (2014) and
Sartawi et al. (2014). Rashid (2013) define company growth (GROWTH) as a percentage of
annual change in sales. Growth is a result of an interaction between a company’s productive
resources and its market opportunities. Allegedly, when companies experience rapid growth,
they tend to pay less dividends and seek financing from the market, thus forcing more disclosure
(Naser et al., 2006). Consequently, the cost of external financing is reduced and improves a
company’s ability to potentially pursue profitable projects. Further, growth companies show
greater information asymmetry and higher agency costs (Eng and Mak, 2003). Hence, they are
expected to disclose more information. Market capitalisation can be used to represent company
size (Wallace and Naser, 1996). Companies with high market capitalisation are generally
exposed to political attacks, such as demands by society for the exercise of social responsibility
or for greater regulation, such as price controls and higher corporate tax (Watts and Zimmerman,
1986). These outcomes can be minimised by more comprehensive disclosure. Conversely,
companies with low market capitalisation are more likely to feel that greater disclosure would be
detrimental to their competitiveness. Market capitalisation (CAP) is expressed in its natural
logarithm.
Ho and Taylor (2007) suggest that companies with high liquidity have stronger incentives to
disseminate more information in their annual reports than companies with lower liquidity.
Company liquidity (LIQ) is measured as the current ratio (Rashid, 2013, 2014; Ho and Taylor,
2007).Company age (AGE) is represented by the number of years that it has been listed on Bursa
Malaysia, expressed as a natural logarithm (Rashid, 2009). There is almost a consensus on the
existence of a relationship between company size and the extent of disclosures made. Studies by
Cormier et al. (2011) and Lu and Abeysekera (2014) confirm the result that size is one of the
major factors determining CSR reporting. Large companies engage in more activities due to
resource availability, produce more information on these activities and are better able to bear the
cost of such processes (Andrew et al., 1989). The natural logarithm of total assets as the proxy
for company size (SIZE) is used, in line with Das et al. (2015), Sartawi et al. (2014) and Rashid
(2014).
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5.3

The Model

The following model is estimated to examine the relationship between corporate governance
attributes and the extent of CSR reporting of Malaysian PLCs:
CSRIi,t= α + β1BINDi,t + β2BSIZEi,t + β3DIROWNi,t + β4INSTITUTi,t + β5DRi,t
+β
β6LIQi,t+β
β7AGEi,t +β
β8SIZEi,t +β
β9ROAi,t +β 10GROWTHi, +β 11CAPi,t
+εεi,t
Where CSRIi,tis CSR index for ith company at time t. BINDi,t is number of independent
directors to the total number of directors for ith company at time t. BSIZEi,t is the total number
of directors for ith company at time t. DIROWNi,t is the percentage of director ownership for ith
company at time t. INSTITUTi,tis the percentage of institutional ownership for ith company at
time t. DRi,tis debt ratio for ith company at time t. LIQi,tis the liquidity ratio for ith company at
time t. AGEi,tis the number of listed years on Bursa Malaysia for ith company at time t. SIZEi,tis
the natural logarithm of total assets for ith company at time t. ROAi,tis the profitability for ith
company at time t. GROWTHi,tis the company growth in sales for ith company at time t.
CAPi,tis the market capitalisation for ith company at time t.α is the intercept, β is the regression
coefficient, andεε is the error term.
The first step to ensure the data not only meets the normality assumption but also is free from
problems of multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity and endogeneity. The assumption of normality
asserts that the distribution of the means across samples is normal, where a bell-curve shape is
exhibited if it is plotted. However, this assumption of normality turns out to be relatively
uncontroversial when large samples are used, for instance, for samples more than 30 (Pallant,
2007). The model is tested using Residual Test/Histogram-Normality Test. and the results
conform to the assumption. The correlation matrix results presented in Table 3show that the
correlation coefficients between the independent variables range from -0.009 to 0.839. Gujarati
(2003) suggests that a multicollinearity problem may exist when the correlation exceeds 0.80,
which is evident from the correlation between company size and market capitalisation. To
confirm whether the assumption is violated, the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for each
independent is also considered. A value of VIF greater than 10 indicates that multicollinearity is
present (Gujarati, 2003). However, none of the VIF values in the model exceed 10, indicating
that multicollinearity is not a serious problem when interpreting the regression results.
The assumption of homoscedasticity is central to any regression model. Homoscedasticity
describes a situation in which the error term is constant across all values of the independent
variables. Standard estimation methods are inefficient when the size of the error term differs
across values of an independent variable, which is also known as heteroscedasticity. The scatter
plot of the residuals (ZRESID) against the predicted value (ZPRED) of the model indicates
heteroscedasticity. The Breusch-Pagan test is thus employed. Likewise, both the Chi square and
corresponding p values indicate heteroscedasticity. Correction is achieved by applying the
standard errors of the White (1980) method. Another major assumption of regression is that
independent variables are not correlated with the error terms. Based on the Hausman Test, when
this assumption is violated, endogeneity occurs. This causes the regression coefficient in the
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression to be biased. This can be addressed by using
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Instrumental Variable regression. The F-test for the predicted value of board independence in
this model is considered not significant. Following Rashid (2014), when the CSR index is used
as a proxy for CSR reporting, F = 2.28 with p = 0.1314. The results indicate that endogeneity is
not a problem. Hence, OLS and Instrumental Variable regression are consistent.
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Table 3 Correlation matrix of the explanatory variables
1
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

BIND

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1.00

BSIZE

-0.414

DIROWN

0.057

**

**

-0.077

DR

0.085 **

LIQ
AGE
SIZE

1.00
-0.089
0.071

1.402
**

**

0.007

0.094

**

0.151

**

-0.011

**

**

-0.053

-0.045

0.339

*

1.00
-0.256

1.126
**

-0.035
-0.008
-0.177

**

-0.181

**

1.00
-0.013
0.002
0.017
0.061

**

1.084
1.00
-0.274

1.136
**

1.00

0.005
0.055

0.063

**

1.119

**

-0.067

**

1.00
0.337

**

1.204
1.00

3.891

ROA

-0.009

0.084**

-0.073**

0.062**

-0.129**

0.049*

0.051**

0.111**

1.00

GROWTH

-0.029

0.025

-0.009

0.049 *

0.018

-0.059**

0.000

0.073**

0.039

-0.063

**

0.321

**

-0.156

**

0.071

**

-0.069

**

0.035

0.268

**

0.839

**

0.174

**

1.054
1.00
0.071

**

1.013
1.00

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

6.
6.1

VIF
1.284

**

INSTITUT

CAP

11

Results
Descriptive statistics

The descriptive statistics of CSR reporting and the independent variables are shown in Table 4.
The average CSR reporting level among PLC is 21.7%. This indicates that despite the existence
of regulation and awareness campaigns, the level of CSR reporting in Malaysia remains
moderately low (Lu and Castka, 2009; Ramasamy and Ting, 2004). Huge variation between the
highest and lowest level of reporting is observed. The finding also implies that transparency and
reporting are not a strong tradition in Malaysian PLCs (Aaijaz and Ibrahim, 2012). On average,
boards comprised 45.2% independent directors. As almost half of the board consists of
independent directors, it is likely for the board to provide more independent judgement, which is
important in making better decisions for shareholders. There is also a greater chance of
enhancing board monitoring effectiveness. The results also reveal that PLCs in Malaysia are
conforming to the MCCG recommendation of having at least one-third independent directors. In
general, companies have an average board size of 7.2, indicating that a moderately large size of
board is preferable. The results regarding director ownership illustrate that, on average, they only
own 4.4% of company shares, with the highest recording 56.8%. Notwithstanding its ability to
align directors’ interests with shareholders, companies prefer to keep directors ownership levels
low. By contrast, there is an extreme difference between the minimum (0%) and maximum
(95.9%) shareholdings by institutions. Average institutional ownership accounts for 26.3% of
total company shareholding.
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Table 4 Descriptive statistics of the variables (N = 2700)

CSRI
BIND
BSIZE
DIROWN
INSTITUT
DR
LIQ
AGE
SIZE
ROA
GROWTH
CAP
6.2

Mean
0.217
0.452
7.236
0.044
0.263
0.402
3.053
13.985
12.878
0.062
0.053
18.798

Median
0.196
0.430
6.686
0.003
0.204
0.378
1.785
15.029
12.650
0.058
0.027
18.503

Minimum Maximum
0.039
0.726
0.170
1.000
3.004
18.174
0.000
0.568
0.000
0.959
0.003
10.319
0.007
96.111
1.000
52.985
9.369
18.411
-2.898
5.547
-4.941
8.578
12.371
24.810

SD
0.120
0.128
1.296
0.088
0.221
0.362
5.199
1.640
1.447
0.178
0.478
1.811

Regression analysis

Panel A of Table 5 shows the adjusted R2 value, which shows that the variation in the extent of
CSR reporting that can be explained by the independent variables is 37.7%. It is argued that
independent directors are more objective when making decisions, thereby increasing the chance
of protecting interests of stakeholders against the possible emergence of opportunist behaviour
by management (Fama and Jensen, 1983). In return, levels of disclosure are increased. It is
expected that a positive relationship between independent directors and the extent of CSR
reporting exists. Consistent with that found by Barako and Brown (2008) and Rashid and Lodh
(2008), the result is significant, which supports this hypothesis. Further, it is predicted that board
size is positively related to the extent of CSR reporting. The result reveals a significant positive
relationship between the two variables, indicating that larger boards can benefit from diversity,
resulting in better involvement in CSR activities and increased reporting (Esa and MohdGhazali,
2012). This outcome matches those observed of studies by Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013) and
Akhtaruddin et al. (2009).
Ownership by directors and institution, company age, size, ROA and market capitalisation are
found to be significantly related to CSR reporting. Directors’ ownership enhances CSR
reporting, with similar findings reported by Leung and Horwitz (2004) and Nasir and Abdullah
(2004). This finding supports the statement by Jensen and Meckling (1976) that directors
ownership helps to match the interests between directors and shareholders. The finding also
illustrates that institutional ownership significantly influences the extent of CSR reporting, which
reinforces the findings of Leung and Horwitz (2004) and Nasir and Abdullah (2004). Through
their power, institutional owners are able to influence management on CSR practices (Shleifer
and Vishny, 1997). Accordingly, companies with institutional investors are more likely to report
more (Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008). As predicted, mature companies tend to disclose more CSR
information in order to demonstrate and reinforce their high reputations. Likewise, larger
companies report more CSR activities, since the costs of disclosures are funded by profits
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(Brammer and Pavelin, 2008). Furthermore, they are more visible to the public, and they tend to
be subject to greater political and regulatory pressures from external interest groups (Watts and
Zimmerman, 1990). To reduce these (potential) political costs, large companies disclose more
information in order to demonstrate that their actions are legitimate and consistent with good
corporate citizenship (Brammer and Pavelin, 2008). Similarly, companies that are highly
profitable are able to absorb the associated costs and hence disclose more information to
stakeholders. Regarding market capitalisation, consistent with our expectations, companies with
high market capitalisation are likely to produce high levels of CSR reporting.

Table 5 Relationship between board composition and CSR reporting
Dependent variable
Panel A
(before
controlling
industry)

for

industry)
CSRI
-0.546
(-19.575)***

CSRI
-0.594
(-17.016)***

BIND

0.033
(1.878)*

0.017
(1.021)

BSIZE

0.042
(4.637)***

0.031
(3.519)**

DIROWN

-0.065
(-2.657)**

-0.044
(-1.828)*

INSTITUT

-0.034
(-3.597)***

-0.044
(-4.648)***

DR

0.001
(0.104)

0.005
(0.994)

LIQ

-0.001
(-1.637)

-0.000
(-0.995)

AGE

0.022
(4.591)***

0.027
(5.591)***

SIZE

0.027
(10.041)***

0.037
(13.619)***

ROA

0.060
(5.504)***

0.046
(4.427)***

GROWTH

-0.000
(-0.093)

-0.001
(-0.181)

CAP

0.014
(6.640)***

0.008
(3.844)***

F statistic
Adjusted

124.567
0.377

35.970
0.465

Intercept

R2

Panel B
(after
controlling

for

The t tests are presented in the parentheses *p< 0.10; ** p< 0.010; *** p< 0.001
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It is argued that companies in certain types of industries may face a different degree of pressure
to disclose information because of competitive reasons (MohdGhazali, 2007). Previous studies
have provided evidence of a significant systematic variation across industries pertaining to their
propensity to make CSR reporting (Brammer and Pavelin, 2008; Giannarakis, 2014). Companies
with high consumer visibility, a high level of political risk or concentrated intense competition
significantly disclose more CSR information in their annual reports(Hackston and Milne, 1996;
MohdGhazali, 2007). The sample in this study comprises companies from multiple industries. To
control for the effects of industry on reporting activities, the model is modified by adding
INDUSTRY dummies. Companies are classified based on a two-digit industrial classification
(SIC) codes. The new regression model isas follows:
CSRIi,t= α + β1BINDi,t + β2BSIZEi,t + β3DIROWNi,t + β4INSTITUTi,t + β5DRi,t
+β
β6LIQi,t+β
β7AGEi,t +β
β8SIZEi,t +β
β9ROAi,t +β 10GROWTHi, +β 11CAPi,t
+yINDUSTRY +εεi,t
The regression coefficients are shown in Panel B of Table 5. As observed, industry has no effect
on the majority of independent variables, except for board independence. Its coefficient has
changed from significant to non-significant. The result seems to indicate that the effectiveness of
independent directors in promoting CSR reporting is relevant only for certain industries. This
suggests that while some independent directors are able to execute well their responsibilities in
one industry, others may not have the capability to do so in other industries. As pointed out by
Haji (2013) and Shamil et al. (2014), the effectiveness of independent directors in increasing the
level of CSR reporting might be hampered, plausibly due to the lack of knowledge and
experience in relation to the type of industry.
7. Conclusions
This study has examined whether independent directors have any association with the extent of
CSR reporting of PLCs in Malaysia. Although independent directors are perceived to represent
stakeholders’ interests, their ability in enhancing company’s CSR reporting is found to be
industry specific. This finding is likely to be related to the structure of the Malaysian board
system. The practice of one-tier board system portrays governance by one body that undertakes
both the management and monitoring functions. When all members of the board are entrusted
with the same tasks and are obliged to perform the same duties, independent directors are most
likely to fail to carry out their supervisory functions objectively. It thus remains a problem of the
one-tier system to find ways to guarantee that a certain number of board members are
independent. In addition, independent directors are elected based on the notion that they are not
materially related to the company. Due to their commitment elsewhere, they usually invest too
little time to really understand the business. This dependence on management means that it is
difficult to execute the supervisory function when independent directors have limited
information on the company’s affairs. Perhaps regular board meetings might better familiarise
them with the company and in turn assist them in making better and more informed decisions.
Independent directors may also have strong family or friendship ties with management, which
influences their independence and weakens their monitoring role (Sartawi et al., 2014). Familyowned businesses being a significant element in the Malaysian economy may also impede
directors’ independence. In these companies, controlling shareholders are significantly
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influential, which might help explain independent directors failure to execute the monitoring
tasks entrusted to them. These clarifications demonstrate the unique principal-principal agency
conflict that exist in companies with concentrated ownership. Clearly, board independence is
central in the attempt to overcome the conflict. Nevertheless, the efficacy of independent
directors is justifiable to certain industry only as evident in this study. Thus, theoretically, the
findings partially support agency theory in explaining the impact of governance on CSR
practices in Malaysia.
The study concludes that having more independent directors does not necessarily enhance board
effectiveness, especially if they are unable to effectively contribute to the board. It is highly
recommended that policymakers search
for alternative methods of electing independent
directors, for instance, appointment by a special committee. Importantly, PLCs need to
continuously recognise the significance of best practices for corporate governance, especially
when its effect on CSR practices is apparent. For instance, the regression analysis provides
evidence that board size contributes to the enhancement of CSR reporting. Fundamentally, this
conclusion indicates that better reporting can result from diverse and knowledgeable directors on
large boards (Esa and MohdGhazali, 2012). Board size is also associated with the capacity to
foster effective monitoring to mitigate agency problems. A high number of directors permit the
board to execute duties effectively, leading to more CSR reporting (Donnelly and Mulcahy,
2008).
The findings of this study need to be carefully interpreted. Fundamentally, different countries are
subject to different regulatory and corporate governance mechanisms. For this reason, the results
cannot be generalised across countries. Further, this study focuses on CSR reporting in annual
reports only, despite the fact that companies utilise other mass communication mechanisms. In
view of this, future work should consider other forms of reporting. It would also be interesting to
assess the effect of other control variables that may play an important role in influencing CSR
reporting. Ethnicity, competitiveness, politically connected companies and listing status are
several control variables relevant to the Malaysian context that could be incorporated into the
model. Finally, because the ability of independent directors to provide impartial perspective in
decision making is industry specific, as suggested by this study, it provides an opportunity for
future researchers to conduct an industry-based study on the effectiveness of independent
directors in enhancing CSR reporting.
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